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Summary
The efficacy of electric utility regulation has not been finally
determined. The purpose of this study is to assess the impact of Commission
regulation on the level of earnings realized by electric power utility firms.
Previous studies have relied upon price data which were generated during the
very early days of utility regulation; moreover, cross section analyses, aggre-
gating firms controlled by diverse regulatory regimes, were employed for assess-
ing the effects of regulation.
Time series data for the individual electric firms operating in Florida,
Iowa, and Mississippi were used in the analysis. These are the only three
states regulated since World War II and it was possible to compare profit
rates for the individual firms before and after Commission regulation was in-
stituted and to make an assessment of the effect of the charge in each case —
the data for each firm are for the period 1943 through 1976.
The results show that firms in the sample were earnings economic profits
prior to regulation and that regulation is responsible for substantial reduc-
tions or total elimination of those profits.
Public policy recommendations and the significance of the results for
the various theories of regulation are also presented.
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WHAT CAN REGULATORS REGULATE: THE CASE
OF ELECTRIC UTILITY RATES OF RETURN
By Walter J. Primeaux, Jr.
INTRODUCTION
Criticism cf utility regulation may now be at a peak; however, the
efficacy of the process has been the subject of considerable skepticism
through the years. The criticism, in general, rests on the alleged
grounds that regulation accomplishes very little or nothing at all.
Electric utility regulation has existed in the U.S. since the
early 1900' s, but there is little convincing evidence that the perfor-
mance of regulated industries differs significantly from what it would
2be in the absence of regulation.
*Paul Newbold, Kimio Morimune, Jon Nelson, David Ciscel, Robert
Rasche, Dan Hollas, John Mikesell, Patrick Mann, Julian Simon, and Randy
Nelson provided useful criticism of an earlier version. This study was
assisted by research grants from the Investors in Business Education,
D.O.E., and the Office of Energy Research at the University of Illinois.
That support is appreciated. Ed Eubny and Andy Jaske provided excellent
research assistance.
See, for example, George J. Stigler and Claire Friedland, "What
Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity," The Journal of Law
and Economics
. Vol. 5, 1962, pp. 1-16; T. G. Moore, "The Effectiveness
of Regulation of Electric Utility Prices," Southern Economic Journal ,
April, 1970, pp. 365-375; C. G. Moore, "Has Electricity Regulation
Resulted in Higher Prices? An Econometric Evaluation Using a Calibrated
Regulatory Input Variable," Economic Inquiry , Vol. XIII, No. 2, June
1975; Walter J. Primeaux, Jr. "Some Problems with Natural Monopoly" The
Antitrust Bulletin vol. XXIV, No. 1, Spring 1979; and Walter J. Primeaux,
Jr. A Reexamination of the Monopoly Market Structure for Electric
Utilities," in Promoting Competition in Regulated Markets Almarin
Phillips (ed.), Washington: the. Brookings Institution, 1975, pp. 175-176,
2
This statement concerning regulated industries was made by Alfred
E. Kahn, The Economics of Regulation (New York: John Wiley and Sons,
Inc., 1971), p. 108. A discussion of regulatory reform is presented in
Electric Utility Rate Reform (Washington, D.C. American Enterprise
Institute, 1977).
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The growing concern with regulatory processes, and the emerging
climate calling for deregulation of business, generates a need for addi-
tional knowledge concerning the performance of firms in the electric
utility industry. If regulation, in fact, generates little or no posi-
tive social benefit, abolition or reform of the institution would prob-
ably be a policy prescription; therefore, assessment of utility regula-
tion is an important undertaking and that is the main objective of this
study.
Previous studies concerning regulation have generated mixed results;
some have found it to be a relatively unimportant institution. Econo-
metric studies may be challenged on several grounds, so it is important
to continue to generate research which will eventually permit an overall
assessment of commission regulation. The purpose of this study is to
assess the impact of commission regulation on earnings realized by elec-
tric utility firms. Although the efficacy of the regulation process
cannot be determined by the absence of economic profits alone, control
of earnings is clearly an important objective of the institution. In-
deed, Kahn explains that regulated profits are the most obvious and com-
3forting evidence that regulation can be "effective.
The results of this investigation show that firms in the sample
were earning economic profits prior to regulation and that regulation
is responsible for substantial reductions or total elimination of those
excessive profits.
3
Alfred E. Kahn, The Economics of Regulation vol. 1 (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1970), p. 31.
-3-
PREVIOUS STUDIES
In a landmark study, G. Stigler and C. Friedland examined the im-
pact of electric utility regulation on rates charged and rates of re-
turn earned. They found that regulation of electric utility firms, as
indicated by the presence of a state regulatory Commission, added noth-
4ing to the explanation of interstate rate differences. The study ex-
plains that the ineffectiveness of regulation stems from two sources.
(1) Individual utility systems do not have any significant long-run
monopoly power, and (2) the regulators cannot force the utility to oper-
ate at a specified combination of output, price, and cost. The authors
make some inferences from their price examinations and conclude that
pure monopoly profits would not occur in the absence of regulation.
T. G. Moore measured the effectiveness of the regulatory process
in reducing prices to residential customers of electric utilities. The
study concludes that regulation has not reduced prices more than 5 per-
cent and probably less than that. Moore explains that, "... without
regulation the firm would face competition from neighboring firms which
might encroach on its territory. To the extent that this type of compe-
tition is possible, any removal of regulation would increase the elas-
ticity of demand faced by a single firm above the elasticity for the
market and so lead to lower prices." Moore concludes that the current
4
Stigler and Friedland, op. cit., pp. 200-203.
5
Ibid.
T. G. Moore, op. cit.
7
Ibid., p. 374.
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form of regulation is not performing one of its main functions and that
some major changes in procedures are due.
Charles Guy Moore found that regulation had a perverse effect be-
cause it actually caused higher prices. He found that the higher prices
were caused, in part, by Commission policy which attempts to discrimi-
nate in favor of the more numerous small users of electricity whose de-
mand is relatively less elastic than the demand of larger users. This
policy would result in a loss of economies of scale and higher prices.
Moore points out that regulators are capable of other errors and any
Commission practice which increases total cost of producing and distrib-
uting electricity will also necessitate raising prices, reducing output,
and foregoing economies of scale. This study, however, does not assess
9
the magnitude of the higher prices and does not examine rates of return.
Jackson found that regulation did not succeed in reducing residen-
tial rates in 1940 and 1950 but was significant in 1960.
Although these four are important empirical studies by competent
economists, they have not determined once and for all the impact of
regulation on the economic performance of electric utility firms. Also,
the previous studies were restricted to examining the price effects of
regulation and, except for the indirect examination by Stigler and
Friedland, the effects of regulation on rates of return were not ex-
amined. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, it has been said that there is
8
Ibid.
9
C. G. Moore, op. cit.
1Q
Raymond Jackson, "Regulation and Electric Utility Rate Levels,"
Land Economics , Vol. XLV, August 1969, pp. 372-376.
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little convincing evidence that the performance of regulated industries
differs significantly from what it would be in the absence of regula-
tion; " therefore, further study of regulation is very important.
THE THEORY
Unregulated monopolies, according to theory, would charge a price
above average cost and earn an economic profit. The notion is that in
the absence of the market mechanism, where price competition would drive
prices dcwn to lower levels, the unregulated monopolist would exact a
higher price and earn higher profits than if it faced competition or if
12
it were regulated. Kahn explains that the regulatory process has fo-
cused primarily on profits as the control target because
...these are politically the most visible—excessive profits
the most obvious danger and sign of consumer exploitation, in
the absence of effective competition, regulated profits the
most obvious- and comforting evidence that regulation can be
"effective."1 "
Kahn's argument is a good one. Even though regulators nay scrutinize
prices very closely as suggested by Joskow, there is an ultimate effect
on profits.
11
Kahn, op. cit.
12
This situation is discussed in Walter J. Primeaux, Jr. , Rate Base
Methods and Realized Rates of Return," Economic Inquiry , Vol. XVI, No.
1, January 1978.
13
Kahn op. cit. Although Kahn explains that excessive profits are
the main concern of regulators, these bodies also review utility opera-
tions for the following possible abuses: (1) inclusion of improper operating
expenses in the cost of service used for rate making; (2) price discrimina-
tion among customers (3) poor customer service. An assessment of price dis-
crimination among customer classes is presented in Walter J. Primeaux, Jr.
and Randy A. Nelson, "An Examination of Price Discrimination and Internal
Subsidization by Electric Utilities," Southern Economic Journal (in press,
July 1980).
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As profits increase for these firms, there may be an in-
creasing tendency for the staff of the regulatory authority
to "suggest" price reductions or improvements in service,
often in response to external pressures from citizens' groups
or politicians. Thus, although there is a constraint tending
to limit continual growth of profits, it appears to be a much
looser kind of constraint than much of the theoretical litera-
ture might lead one to believe. Regulated firms do appear to
respond to this moral suasion from time to time, because the
regulatory authority has the power to force a formal regula-
tory review and firms feel that they will do better in the
long run if they keep the Commission happy by filing a rate
reduction from time to time rather than by waiting for the
Commission to come after them.
The above discussions indicate that effective regulation would be ex-
pected to reduce the profit levels of electric utility monopolists.
The residential natural gas price faced by an electric utility
monopolist would also affect its profit level. Since gas is a substi-
tute for some important electric utility applications, such as heating
and clothes drying, one would expect a direct relationship between prof-
it rates and natural gas prices. As residential prices of a competitive
gas company increase, profitability of the electric monopoly would in-
crease as customers convert to using electricity where feasible.
Profitability of an electric utility monopolist would be affected
by the general regulatory climate and economic trends throughout the
14
Paul L. Joskow "Pricing Decisions of Regulated Firms: A
Behavioral Approach" Bell Journal of Economics , Spring, 1973, p. 123.
This relationship would not necessarily hold in a gas-electric
combination company. In this situation, the firm is a monopolist both
for gas and electricity and sells both services in a given city. Con-
sequently, a consumer facing a higher price for natural gas may change
to electricity but the same firm would continue to earn profit from
selling the substitute energy to him. The net effect on profitability,
in this case, depends upon both how the regulatory commission discrimi-
nates between gas and electric prices and the extent of consumer responses
to price changes.
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country. Utility Commissions do not operate in a vacuum. They observe
what is happening in other jurisdictions and react accordingly. This
is not to say that they all react in the same way, but that they are all
influenced to some extent by the overall economic and social environment
in which regulated utility firms exist. This tendency is enhanced by
the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners which pub-
lishes statistics and engages in other matters of interest to regulators
and students of regulation. Because of these influences, one would
expect profitability of individual firms in this business to parallel
that of the industry as a whole. Consequently, as profitability in the
electric utility industry increases, regulators are more likely to allow
increased profitability of firms in their jurisdiction.
Sales growth is another important influence on profitability of the
firm; however, the net effect cannot be determined unambiguously. The
fact is, sales growth would probably cause a firm's total profit to in-
crease but profitability per unit sold may rise or decline, depending
on operating conditions of the particular firm involved. Profitability
per unit sold would increase as sales increase if the firm is operating
with excess capacity. Even if excess capacity does not exist, if
Charles F. Phillips The Economics of Regulation (Homewood:
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1969), p. 96 explains that this body has also
established for its members an annual regulatory development course
which covers regulatory principles and their applications. This re-
flects their influence on Commission thinking and attitudes. The im-
portance of the regulatory climate is discussed in Richard N. Benjamin's
"Economic and Regulatory Problems of Electric Utilities" in The
Economics of Regulation of Public Utilities Evanston: Northwestern
University, 1966., p. 19.
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regulatory lag is minimized, and higher consumer prices are quickly
approved as costs rise when new customer lead is added, profits per
unit may increase. On the other hand, sales growth could cause lower
per unit profitability, if the firm's average costs are rising and if
the firm faces long regulatory lags before higher rates are approved
to offset the rising costs incurred as new customers are added. So
two effects are reflected by sales growth; these are capacity utiliza-
tion and regulatory lag.
Electric utility regulation is based on "cost-plus-profit" proce-
dure. Under this form of regulation, the utility firm is permitted
to recover all costs of operation. Earnings are generated by the firm
being allowed to earn a fair return on its investment. Consequently,
all taxes, operating expenses, and depreciation are recoverable by the
utility firm, then a fair return on investment is added as compensation
18
to investors. ' To the extent that consumer rates are established
on a previous test year basis, future expected costs are the costs in-
volved in the rate determination procedures, not costs actually incurred
by the firm during the relevant operating year.
The regulatory Commission has the responsibility of attempting to
protect the investors of the utility firm. At the same time, it must
This point is made in William G. Shepherd's "Utility Growth and
Profits Under Regulation" in Utility Regulation New Directions in Theory
and Policy , ed. William G. Shepherd and Thomas G. Gies (New York:
Random House, 1967) p. 30: and Dudley F. Pegrum Public Utility
Regulation of Business (Homewood: Richard D. Irwin, 1965), pp. 664-682.
18
The rate making procedure is quite complex and it will not be
discussed here. A case study of rate making and a discussion of costs
of service is presented in Paul J. Garfield and Wallace F. Lovejoy
Public Utility Economics (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964), pp.
249-259.
-9-
avoid exploitation of consumers as would occur if rates became exces-
sive and the firm earned an economic profit. Commissions must consider
inflationary pressure to protect both the utility and the consumer. One
authority in public utility regulation has stated:
Some Commissions add a percentage allowance in the rate
of return to offset the shift in price level or attrition due
to rapid growth in a period of inflation.
Joskow has also indicated the need for regulatory adjustments and pre-
sents an "inflation premium" hypothesis.
In an effort to make up losses that result from regula-
tory lag in an inflationary world the Commission may allow a
higher proportion of "corrected" firm requests during periods
of rapid inflation than it would in a period of relatively
stable prices.
Joskow presents regression results which give some support to his "in-
flation premium" hypothesis.*"
Given the rate making procedure of utility companies, one would
expect per unit profitability to be unaffected by production expenses.
If the regulated price is just compensating the utility firm for its
production costs, one would expect rising or falling production costs
to have a neutral effect on per unit profitability. If the regulators
because of inflation allow a higher rate of return to compensate for the
19
John P. Bauer Updating Public Utility Regulation : Assuring Fair
Rates and Fair Returns (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1966),
p. 65.
20
Paul L. Joskow "The Determination of the Allowed Rate of Return
in a Formal Regulatory Hearing," The Eell Journal of Economics , Autumn
1972, p. 641.
21
Ibid., p. 643.
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22higher costs, as suggested by Bauer and Jaskow, " the higher produc-
tion costs will cause higher per unit profit. Essentially, in this
case, the utility firm is allowed to recover, through higher prices,
more than its increase in costs.
METHODOLOGY
Following the above statement by Kahn, this study examines rates
of return (profits) as evidence of the efficacy of electric utility
regulation. If regulators do consider profits as their primary control
target, as he suggests, this is indeed the appropriate variable to ex-
23
amine.
Previous studies have largely relied upon price data which were
generated during the very early days of utility regulation and some have
depended on cross section analyses, aggregating firms controlled by di-
verse state regulatory regimes.
The method employed here was designed to avoid some of the problems
previously mentioned. If, indeed, utility regulation across the country
24
is applied in a very "uneven" manner, as suggested in a previous study,
cross section comparisons may be infected with problems which are very
difficult to isolate. Moreover, regulators are expected to accomplish
22
Bauer, op. cit. and Jaskow, op. cit.
23
The important problem of how to manipulate rates of return to in-
duce efficiency is not addressed here. For discussions of this problem
see: Kahn, op_. cit
. , p. 53 and William Iulo, Electric Utilities—Costs
and Performance: A Study of Inter Utility Differences in the Unit
Electric Costs of Privately Owned Electric Utilities (Pullman:
Washington State University, 1961).
24
Primeaux, op. cit., p. 105.
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efficient outcomes because automatic markets are not permitted to oper-
ate. Their task is very difficult and there is no certainty that the
effects of regulation will fall upon firms in a consistent manner. In-
deed, it is entirely reasonable to expect one firm to fare better than
25
another in the same state, under the same regulators. " In a cross sec-
tion study, aggregation of data makes it very difficult to assess the
impact of commission regulation on an individual firm.
Time series data for the individual electric firms operating in
Florida, Iowa and Mississippi were used in the statistical analyses.
These states were used because they are the only ones in which Commission
26
regulation was implemented since 19 48; and it was possible to compare
profit rates for individual firms before and after Commission regulation
was installed and make an assessment of the effect of the change in each
case. The earliest data are from 1948 because of concern that the World
War II or depression periods wculd affect the validity of the results.
Each firm was examined individually by ordinary least squares
27
regressions, employing time series data from 1948 through 1976. This
procedure made it possible to isolate the specific impact of Commission
regulation on each firm's rate of return.
25
This is not explicitly stated but is implied in Primeaux, op. cit.
26
Actually, Minnesota and Texas have also implemented Commission regu-
lation since WWII but it was not possible to include them in this study.
Commission regulation has jurisdiction in Texas only where it has been re-
quested by the public, and data are insufficient in Minnesota's case because
it was only recently regulated.
27
Tata are from Statistics of Privately Owned Electric Utilities in
the United States (Washington, D.C., Federal Power Commission, various years)
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Commission regulation was implemented in Florida in 1951, in Iowa
in 1963, and in Mississippi in 1956. Figure 1 lists all of the class
A & B privately owned electric utility firms in the three states being
examined; there are thirteen firms involved. Publicly owned (munici-
pally owned) firms were not included in the sample, because they are
28
not regulated by the state regulatory Commissions.
This study assumes that the time of establishment of the state
regulatory commission is the time when effective regulation was imple-
mented in the state. It must be assumed that the State Regulatory
Commission was designed to be effective by the legislation setting up
the agency. If the Commission proves to be ineffective, that merely
29
reflects unfavorably upon regulation as an effective institution.
One might assert that the firms were not entirely free from some
sort of regulation prior to the date that the State commission was es-
tablished, therefore, a comparison of before and after performance would
not really reveal how effective regulation is. However, the central
issue in all of the previous studies, as well as this examination, is,
in fact, how effective is State commission regulation in affecting eco-
28
Profitability of publicly owned electric firms is discussed in
Patrick Mann "Fublicly-Owned Electric Utility Profits and Resource
Allocation" Land Economies , November, 1970, pp. 478-484.
29
The question examined is how effective is regulation; not, how
effective is effective regulation.
-13-
Figure 1
ALL CLASS A & B ELECTRIC UTILITIES
IN FLORIDA, IOWA, AND MISSISSIPPI
(Firms constituting the sample of the study)
Florida Iowa Mississippi
Florida Power Corp.
Florida Power & Light
Co.
Tampa Electric Co.
Gulf Power Co.
Florida Public
Utilities Co.
Iowa Illinois Gas &
Electric Co.
Iowa Southern Utilities
Co. .
Iowa Public Service Co.
Iowa Power & Light Co.
Interstate Power Co.
Iowa Electric Light &
Power Co.
Mississippi Power Co,
Mississippi Power &
Light
Serves both Iowa and Illinois. Iowa sales were 64. 64 percent of total
KWH sales in 1979.
Serves Iowa and South Dakota. Iowa sales were 99.1 percent of total
KITE sales in 1979.
'Serves Illinois, Iowa, and Minnesota. Iowa sales were 79.6 percent of
total sales in 1979.
Proportions of sales in Iowa were provided through Mr. Robert Latham
of the Iowa Commerce Commission in a telephone conversation May 23, 1980.
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nomic performance. This is really the important question, since this
30
form of regulation dominates all others.
THE REGRESSION MODEL
As mentioned earlier, ordinary Least Squares linear regression
analysis was used to determine the effects of Commission regulation on
the rates of return of firms in the sample.
The specification of the rate of return function is:
n/S = A + B REG + B
2
RGAS + B.NI/OR + B.SGRO + BgPE/S + U
where
:
U = random distrubance term.
II/S = is realized net income in dollars per 1000 kwh sold.
(Dependent variable).
REG is a regulatory dummy variable, taking a value of 1 for
years when the firm was regulated by a state Commission,
a zero for years before.
RGAS = residential average natural gas price, in thousands of
dollars per trillion BTU's.
NI/OR = net income as a percent of operating revenue for all
class A and B utilities in the U.S. (an index or trend
variable indicating national movements in profitability
or rates of return).
SGRO = a demand growth variable, in percent change of KWH sold.
A proxy for capacity utilization and regulatory lag.
PE/S = Production expense in dollars per 1000 kwh.
30
The usual arrangement was that firms were regulated at the local
level by some sort of city commission prior to state commission regula-
tion.
One study found local regulation even less effective than state
commission regulation. See: R. J. Sampson, "Comparative Performance
of Electric Utilities Under State and Under Local Rate Regulation,"
Land Economics , Vol. XXXIV, No. 2, May, 1958, p. 178.
-15-
Some additional details and an elaboration cf the data and the na-
ture of the variables are presented in the appendix.
All financial data were deflated by the GNP implicit price defla-
tor and separate time series equations were run for each firm. These
data reflect firm performance for the years 1948-1976. The regulation
variable (REG) was lagged to conform to the Stigler and Friedland study
where regulation was said to have taken place three years after the
31
State Commission was established. ' The purpose of this procedure was
to allow a sufficiently long period of time for regulation to be effec-
tive after it was actually installed.
The H/S variable (net income in dollars per 1000 KWH sold) is a
proxy for the rate of return earned by the electric utility firm. This
specification was used as the dependent variable because of the desire
to assess the effect of Commission regulation on firms profits. Plant
or assets were not considered to be the appropriate units to use to
standardize earnings for comparison purposes. Utility firms add plant
capacity in discrete units and there was concern that plant additions
always create excess capacity. This condition would cause lar^e in-
creases in the denominator, without comparable increases in the numera-
tor. Moreover, all plant is not necessarily of the same vintage. Con-
sequently, questions are raised concerning the appropriate real value
of the assets. The decision was made to use sales units (KtfH) as the
denominator because this measure is clearly and consistently defined
throughout the whole time series period. Moreover, since time series
31
Stigler and Friedland, op. cit.
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data are used, the necessary distinction between per unit profitability
and total profitability does not create serious problems.
The RGAS variable was included to consider the effect of the price
of residential natural gas as a substitute for electricity. Since natu-
ral gas is a substitute for electricity for several important uses, a
positive sign would be expected on this variable.
The NT /OR variable was included to consider the regulatory environ-
ment and the overall electric utility profit trends in the equation. To
the extent that regulators in a given state behave in the same way as
regulators across the whole country, one would expect a positive sign
on this variable.
The SGRO variable would have a negative sign because as more units
of electricity are sold, less efficient generating units are brought into
use and this causes per unit cost to rise, causing profit per unit to
fall. This relationship would hold unless the firm has excess capacity
of high efficiency quality for use in providing the additional service.
If regulators just allow cost recovery by the utility firm, the
PE/S variable would be expected to be insignificant and unrelated to
profit per KWH sold. Since this variable is a proxy for total costs of
the firm, one would not expect that it would affect profitability, unless
regulatory commissions allow excessive or insufficient estimates of
costs in the procedure of rate determination. If the regulatory commis-
sions tend to project excessive cost estimates, this variable would have
a positive sign and if they underestimate cost levels this variable would
have a negative sign. Gf course, allowed rates of return and recoverable
-17-
expenses are translated into realized rates of return and recovered
32
expenses by the prices established for consumer services.
REGRESSION RESULTS
This section presents the regression equations for each of the
thirteen firms included in the sample. Both OLS and seemingly unrelated
regression equations were run but the results were quite similar so
only the OLS results are presented. Only linear equations are pre-
sented; log specifications were also run but they did not increase
the level of explained variance.
In addition to the variables mentioned above, an OPEC dummy variable
was included to attempt to isolate the effect of the energy shortage on
rates of return earned by electric utility firms included in the sample.
This variable was not statistically significant and it showed a high de-
gree of multicollinearity with other independent variables. Consequent-
ly, it was omitted. Interaction variables were statistically significant
and regression coefficients were unaffected when they were removed.
32
As mentioned earlier, the electric utility regulatory procedure
allows a recovery of all expenses and costs only, plus a rate of return
on investment. See: William G. Shepherd, op. cit. A discussion of how
consumer prices must be compatible with the allowed rate of return is
presented in Harold Somers "Rate of Return and Misallocation of Resources"
in Joseph E. Haring and Joseph F. Humphrey (eds.) Utility Regulation
During Inflation Los Angeles: Occidental College Economics Research
Center, 1971), p. 44. Consumer prices, of course, translate the regu-
lated or allowed return into the amount which companies will realize
from sales of services and ultimately net profit. The regulated and
allowed rates of return are discussed in R. Blaine Roberts, G. S.
Maddala and Gregory Enholm "Determinants of the Requested Rate of Return
and the Rate of Return Granted in a Formal Regulatory Process" Bell
Journal of Economics , Autumn 1978, pp. 611-621.
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33
The Cochrane-Orcutt interative technique was employed to
develop a model which would be free of significant autocorrelation.
The equations adjusted by this procedure are indicated on the tables
which present the final regressions.
The overall results show rather strong support for the notion that
commission regulation has probably reduced economic profits in the
electric utility industry.
Florida
Table 1 presents equations for the five firms in the sample from
the State of Florida. The RGAS variable reveals that some consumers
did react to higher gas prices by switching to electricity for some pur-
poses. The table shows positive signs on the RGAS variable in four of
the five equations. Only in the equations for Florida Public Utilities
Company and Gulf Power Company is the RGAS variable significant at the
ten percent level or better, showing that higher natural gas prices
actually caused higher per unit profits for these firms.
The NI/OR variable is positive in all equations and statistically
significant at the five percent level or better in four of the five
cases. The positive sign indicates that the Florida firms were all
allowed to increase their profitability, as the profitability of
electric utility firms across the country increased. This is probably
an indication that the Florida public utility commission is responsive
to the needs of the regulated firms and is sensitive to the economic
and social environment existing across the country.
33
D. Cochrane and G. H. Orcutt, "Application of Least Squares
Regression to Relationships Containing Autocorrelated Error Terms,"
Journal of American Statistical Association, March 1949, pp. 749-809.
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The SGRO variable is statistically insignificant in all cases; so
profits per unit for the Florida firms did not change as sales growth
occurred. This result can be explained in terms of production capabil-
ity which allowed these firms to sell additional units of electricity
without relying on less efficient generating facilities.
The PE/S variable is significant at the five percent level or
better in two of the five regressions in Table 1, and the coefficient
is consistently positive. This set of coefficients shows that profits
increased as costs increased, reflecting a tendency for the Florida
Commission to overcompensate firms for the cost incurred in operating
the business.
The coefficient on the REG variable indicates that regulation has
caused lower profits in three of the five Florida firms in this sample.
Florida Power Corporation has experienced a tendency toward higher prof-
its since regulation and Florida Power and Light Company has experienced
a tendency toward lower profits since regulation, but both effects are
statistically insignificant. The coefficients on the REG variable for
Tampa Electric Company, Florida Public Utilities Co., and Gulf Power
Company reflect significantly lower profits after State regulation was
established.
After State Commission regulation, Tampa Electric Co. profits were
lower by $.598 per 1000 KWH sold; Florida Public Utilities Co. profits
were lower by $3,566 per 1000 KWH sold; and Gulf Power Co. profits were
lower by $4,728 per 1000 KWH sold.
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Iowa
Table 2 presents the equations for the six firms in the sample
fron the state of Iowa. As indicated in the table, every firm from
the state of Iowa is a combination firm, selling both natural gas and
electricity. The table also shows that the coefficient on the RGAS
variable is negative in every case and statistically significant at
the five percent level or better in five of the six equations. These
results mean that consumers do react to higher natural gas prices and
do generally switch to electricity for some uses as the price of nat-
ural gas rises. The results also show that this substitution caused
lower profits for the six public electric utility monopolists who also
sell natural gas. These results seem to indicate that the regulatory
Commission in Iowa has allowed combination firms to earn higher profits
from natural gas than from equivalent electric services.
The NI/OR variable is positive in all cases and statistically
significant in five of the six equations at the five percent level or
better. As with the Florida firms, this indicates that the Iowa Com-
mission allowed firms to increase their profitability as the profit-
ability of firms across the country increased. This is an indicator
of the responsiveness of the Iowa Commission to the needs of regulated
firms in that state.
The SGRO variable is negative in five of the six equations for
the Iowa firms. However, the variable is statistically significant
in only one equation. The significant coefficient indicates that Iowa
Puhlic Service Co. incurred decreases in profits per unit sold as it's
sales increased. These results probably reflect that as sales growth
-22-
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took place this firm used less efficient plants to produce the addi-
tional output, reducing profit per unit. They may also reflect that
this firm was not as aggressive and successful in seeking rate adjust-
ments when sales were growing and costs were increasing, consequently,
profits were adversely affected by regulatory lag. Of course, both of
these explanations are likely and they may apply concurrently.
The PE/S variable is positive and significant at the five percent
level or better in five of the six equations in table 2. These results
reflect a strong tendency of the Iowa Commission to overcompensate
firms for the projected cost component in their electric rate computa-
tion. The results mean that profits are higher for these firms as
costs increase.
The coefficient of the REG variable reveals that Commission regula-
tion has caused lower profits for four of the six Iowa firms included
in the sample. Table 2 reveals that the coefficient on the REG variable
is significant at the five percent level cr better for all Iowa firms,
except Iowa Southern Utilities Co. and Iowa Power & Light Co.
The equations in table 2 reveal that the profit reductions from
Commission regulation ranged from a low of $.939 per 1000 KWH sold
for Iowa Electric Light and Power Co. to a high of $1,711 per 1000
KWH sold for Iowa Illinois Gas Electric Co. Intermediate reductions
per 1000 KWH sold were: Interstate Power Co. ($1,185), and Iowa
Public Service Co. ($1,543).
Mississippi
Table 3 presents the equations for the two firms in the sample from the
state of Mississippi. The sign on the RGAS variable is in the expected
-24-
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direction, indicating that higher natural gas prices cause profits of
the electric utilities to increase. These firms are electric mono-
polies but they do not sell natural gas, as in the case of the firms
from Iowa. Consumers substituting electricity for natural gas when
gas prices rise would increase the profitability of electric firms.
The RGAS coefficients in the equations were significant at the five
percent level or better.
The NI/OR for Mississippi Power and Light Company is positive
but insignificant at the ten percent level but the coefficient on this
variable in the Mississippi Power Co. equation is negative and statis-
tically significant. These results show that the Mississippi regulatory
Commission, in contrast to both the Florida and Iowa Commissions, does
not seem to be so responsive to the overall regulatory environment in
permitting firms in that state to increase profits. This may also in-
dicate a lack of responsiveness of the Mississippi Public Service Com-
mission to the needs of the regulated firms in that state.
The SGRO variable is negative for both firms but only significant
for Mississippi Power Co. Mississippi Power Co. has possibly faced
extensive regulatory lag in obtaining rate increases in the face of
rising costs per KWH sold. Profits per unit sold are unaffected as
sales growth takes place for Mississippi Power and Light Co.
The PE/S variable is significant in the equation at the five
percent level for Mississippi Power Co. but not for Mississippi Power
& Light Co. These results indicate that the Mississippi Commission is
just allowing Mississippi Power & Light Co. to recover costs as they in-
crease, so profit per unit is unaffected. In Mississippi Power Co's.
-26-
situation, however, the Commission undercompensates the firm and profits
per unit fall as production expenses increase.
The negative coefficients on the REG variable reveals that Com-
mission regulation has tended to lower profit per kwh sold for both
firms in Mississippi. Only in Mississippi Power Co's case, however,
is the reduction statistically significant. Mississippi Power Company
profits have been lowered by $.585 per 1000 kwh sold.
CONCLUSIONS
Commission regulation has lowered rates of return earned by elec-
tric utility firms included in this study. Table k presents the mean
value of the dependent variable for each firm in the sample and the
regulatory effect for comparison purposes. Eleven cf the thirteen firms
included experienced pressure toward lower rates of return after com-
mission regulation.
Of the five firms operating in Florida, three experienced statis-
tically significant lower rates of return after regulation. The lower
profits developed from this analysis ranged from $.598 per 10C0 KWH
sold to $4,728 per 1000 KWH sold.
Only two of the six firms operating in the state of Iowa did not
experience statistically significant lower rates of return after Commis-
sion regulation. The reductions experienced by the four firms which
were affected ranged from a low of $.939 to a high of $1,711 per 1000
KWH sold.
One of the two firms operating in Mississippi experienced lower
profits after regulation. The reduction amounted to $.585 per 1000
KWH sold.
-27-
TABLE 4
SUMMARY OF MEAN VALUES FOR DEPENDENT VARIABLE
COMPARED WITH VALUES FOR DUMMY VARIABLE
(Firms in the Sample)
Florida
Florida Power Corp.
Florida Power & Light Cc.
Tampa Electric Co.
Gulf Power Co.
Florida Public Utilities Co.
Mean of Florida Firms
Iowa
Iowa Illinois Gas & Electric (
Iowa Southern Utilities Cc.
Iowa Public Service Co.
Iowa Power and Light Co.
Interstate Power Co.
Iowa Electric Light and Power
Mean of Iowa Firms
Mississippi
Mississippi Power Co.
Mississippi Power and Light ,
Mean of Mississippi Firms
* statistically insignificant
a measured in terms of dollars per 1000 KWH sold
b mean of statistically significant effects only
(ten percent level or better)
Regulatory Effect Mean Value
a
Dummy Variable Dependent Variable
-$1,579* $1,249
+ .886A* $ .906
-$ .598 $2,891
-$4,728 $5,066
-S3. 566 $4,630
-$2,964 $2,948
o. -$1,711 $4,067
+$ .590* $4,252
-$1,543 $7,244
- .034* $ .991
-$1,185 $4,512
-$ .939 $3,648
-$1,344 $4,119
-$ .585 $1,244
-$ .246* $ .796
-$ .585 $1,020
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Table 4 reveals that the Iowa firms showed the highest average
profitability at $4,119 per 1000 KWH sold, the Florida firms averaged
$2,948 and the Mississippi firms averaged $1,020 per 1000 KWH sold.
Table 4 also shows that the regulatory Commission of Florida
has reduced economic profits by the greatest average magnitude, $2,964
per 1000 KWH sold. The Mississippi Commission reduced economic profits
by the smallest amount, $.585 per 1000 KWH sold and the Iowa Commission
reduced economic profits by $1,344 per 1000 KWH sold. These data
give some indication of the relative impact of Commission regulation
in these three states.
One conclusion is that some firms fared better under regulation
than others. These kinds of differences are obscured in aggregated
studies and they do show the merit of time series approaches to assess-
ing the impact of regulation.
The results of this study add support to the "inflation premium"
hypothesis, presented by Joskow. Indications are that commissions
tend to overcompensate the firms in the sample for rising production
3A
expenses.
The above results, however, are at odds with those presented in
35
the Stigler-Friedland study. " Stigler and Friedland concluded that
pure monopoly profit would not accrue to electric utility firms in the
absence of regulation. The evidence cited above clearly reflects lower
Joskow, op. cit.
35
Stigler and Friedland, op. cit.
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profit rates after state regulation was installed. Consequently, it
is reasonable to conclude that most firms in the sample were indeed
earning economic profits prior to regulation.
The findings are inconsistent with the "Capture" theory of regu-
lation advocated by Stigler, Posner and Peltzman. There does not
seem to be any indication or evidence that the utility firms experi-
encing lower profits have control over the commissions regulating
37
them. If these utility firms were actually in control of the
Commissions, one would expect them to maintain the profit levels
experienced before regulation was implemented. One possible policy
conclusion is that proponents of deregulation should move cautiously
in this industry. Consumer welfare is indeed benefiting to some
extent from Commission regulation in the three states examined here,
to the extent that monopoly profits have been reduced or eliminated.
It is not possible to determine if monopoly profits have been totally
eliminated by commission regulation. The dummy variables show a reduc-
tion in profitability of a significant degree. Since the firms have
remained in business, it seems possible to conclude that they are
earning a fair return on investment and that their profits prior to
regulation were excessive.
George Stigler, "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal
of Economics and Management Science Spring 1971, pp. 3-21; Richard A.
Posner, "Theories of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics
and Management Science Autumn 1974, pp. 335-58; Sam Peltzman, "Toward
A More General Theory of Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics
August 1976, pp. 211-40.
37
Arizona Corporation Commission, Fifty-eighth Annual Report , 1970,
p. 9 reports that the Commission of Iowa is appointed by the Governor
while the Commissions of Florida and Mississippi are elected by voters.
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Finally, although regulation has reduced rates of return in most
cases examined here, from a public policy point of view it is still
not clear that regulation is cost effective. Moreover, regulation is
also charged with responsibilities other than financial control and
we are unable to determine whether performance in those areas is effec-
tive. These are all important matters which require rigorous research.
APPENDIX
Data Sources
All data are from Statistics of Privately Owned Electric Utilities
in the U.S . except the gas price data. Gas price information was ob-
tained from Gas Facts .
The state average prices for residential natural gas was obtained
by taking state residential gas sales revenue (in thousands of dollars)
and dividing that number by state residential gas quantity sold (in
trillions of BTU's).
The GNP implicit price deflator was taken from the Economic Report
of the President.
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